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Abstract: In this study we offer a socio-pragmatic examination of instances of
what is generally known in social psychology as “bystander intervention,” i.e.,
the social action by which a bystander steps in and attempts to prevent a
wrongdoer from abusing a victim. We explore the relationship between (im)po-
liteness and participants’ perceptions and understandings of moral principles
as evidenced by their metacommunicative voicing. Our analysis concentrates
on cases of bystander intervention in the US by analyzing data drawn from a
reality show. Bystander intervention is a noteworthy phenomenon to examine
for, at least, two reasons. First, it is a type of aggressive social action as it poses
an uninvited and open challenge to the wrongdoer in public. Second, bystander
intervention challenges conventional behavioural norms. It aims to reinstate
what the intervener regards as morally appropriate behaviour. This study aims
to contribute to current research on (im)politeness by offering a yet unexplored
dimension: that of the interface between metapragmatics, (im)politeness and
(im)morality in the interactional arena of bystander intervention.
Keywords: (im)morality, bystander intervention, metacommunication, rituals,
aggression
1 Introduction
In this study we offer a socio-pragmatic examination of instances of what is
generally known in social psychology as bystander intervention (e.g., Darley
and Latané 1968) where we explore the relationship between (im)politeness
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and participants’ perceptions and understandings1 of moral principles as evi-
denced by their metacommunicative voicing. In so doing, we address a key
knowledge gap in the field of (im)politeness research.
Our analysis concentrates on cases of bystander intervention in the US by
analyzing data drawn from a reality show (see Section 1.2). Bystander interven-
tion comes into existence as a bystander (or a group) decides to interrupt an
on-going act of injustice performed in a public domain; in the present case, a
scene of verbal abuse, in order to protect the victim, by giving voice to what
the intervener regards as the opinion of the public, and potentially recruiting
others. The “line” (Goffman 1967) the intervener takes in this social situation
is indicative of her or his point of view, and as we argue in this paper, what he
or she regards as immoral. In those cases, when other bystanders are recruited
and their actions “align” (Goffman 1974: 496) with that of the intervener, the
intervention itself as well as the intervener’s public face (Bargiela-Chiappini
2003) is endorsed.2 On the other hand, misaligned actions from recruited by-
standers run the risk of putting the intervener “out of face” (Goffman 1967
[1955]).
Bystander intervention is a ritual action. Rituals represent performances,
which (re)enact the normative beliefs or values of a relational network or a
broader social group such as singing a national anthem or retelling a joke
(Kádár 2013). In the context of bystander intervention, “the ritual of outspoken-
ness refers to the expected dramatic action of stepping up against the commit-
ter – or group of committers – of a seemingly immoral action” (Kádár and de
la Cruz, in press). If one takes an analyst’s view on participation in acts of
intervention via outspokenness, it can be argued that through outspokenness
an unratified “bystander” or a group of bystanders are transformed into ratified
“side-participant(s).” Note that we adopt these concepts of “unratified bystand-
er” and “ratified side-participants” by following the framework presented in
Kádár and Haugh (2013: 89), which present participant statuses differently from
Goffman (1967). Due to its expected nature, outspokenness reinforces the situat-
ed moral expectations (Boltanski and Thévenot 2000) of other bystanders (and
prospective lay observers of the event as far as it is recorded) in as much as
1 It is important to draw a distinction between the participants’ first order perceptions and
second order understandings of an interactional phenomenon. When it comes to the meta-
pragmatics of morality and moral judgments (Section 1), an act is perceived as (im)moral when
metacomments on it reflect the participants’ folk-theoretical/philosophical understandings of
it (see Kádár and Haugh 2013).
2 It is pertinent to note that forms of endorsement span hardly noticeable non-verbal signs,
through to cheering and verbal attacks on the wrongdoer (see Kádár and de la Cruz in press).
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it represents a symbolically reparative performance of socially unacceptable
behaviour. Experimental studies in social psychology have demonstrated that
bystanders and observers of abuse often hope that there will be someone coura-
geous enough to take action and feel shame if they fail to intervene (see, for
example, Darley and Latané 1968; Fischer et al. 2006). This, we argue, is be-
cause the majority perceives the wrongdoer’s action as morally inadmissible.
The examination of the ritual of outspokenness, therefore, helps us to explore
the relationship between (im)morality, (im)politeness and metapragmatics.
Bystander intervention is a reactive form of action, which has a clear rela-
tionship with morality as it comes into existence through what social psycholo-
gists describe as “moral judgement” (see, for example, Colby 1987; Haidt and
Baron 1996; Piaget 1997; Feinberg and Willer 2012). Essentially, moral judge-
ment refers to the moral evaluation of an on-going act. In this sense, bystander
intervention is not an objective evaluative process. It emerges from the inter-
vener’s initial reaction and intuitive emotion that something is “right” or
“wrong” based on her or his culture, personal background and psyche, and its
subsequent reappraisal, that is, the process by which the initial emotion is
framed as evidenced in the interpretation of the event i.e., the voicing of moral
concern, which in the case of the examples presented here is metacommunica-
tively articulated.
A moral judgement may be followed by an action; such actions are morally
loaded not only because they are preceded by a moral judgement, but also
because others tend to perceive them (by morally judging the social action of
moral judgement) through moral lenses (Bauman 1991). It is important to draw
a distinction between a broader set of morally loaded actions (e.g., telling one’s
child dos and don’ts) and bystander intervention, as the latter takes place in
a) the public domain and b) from an unratified position in as much as the
wrongdoer and the victim display conventional forms of relatedness (e.g., Duck
1994, 1996; Kaplan 2005; Knobloch and Solomon 2003) and the intervener is
not part of that relationship. Bystander intervention is different from the broad-
er semantic category of “intervention” as the latter involves a wide variety of
interpersonal scenes, with different power relationships, moral judgements,
and so on.
Bystander intervention is a noteworthy phenomenon to study for the
(im)politeness researcher. This is because it is a type of aggressive social action
which, on the one hand, challenges the conventional norm of being non-con-
flictive with others, and on the other hand, aims to reinstate what the interven-
er regards as morally appropriate behaviour. In other words, in bystander inter-
vention, conventional norms which are regarded as “social oughts” (Culpeper
2011) are challenged by “moral oughts” as the intervener butts into an interac-
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tion between people who are unrelated to her or him, but related to each other.
Although bystander interventions may take place between two strangers fight-
ing with each other, the examples addressed in this article comprise instances
of a bystander’s intervention in someone else’s (presumably) intimate relation-
ship (i.e., friends, boyfriend and girlfriend, family unit) as conventionally un-
derstood in the culture where the data come from.
The seeming immorality of the wrongdoer’s action runs contrary to norma-
tive behavioural expectations in the public domain,3 thus leading the interven-
er to interfere in someone else’s private domain (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987:
73). The wrongdoer appears to be intimately related to the victim while the
intervener is a complete stranger. Notwithstanding this, the wrongdoer, the
victim and the intervener – as well as other bystanders – share for a fleeting
moment the same space. In this sense, the intervener could, in theory, justify
the bystander intervention by appealing to an infringement of her or his per-
sonal space in a public domain.4 This is because the intervener has the right
to move freely in public spaces – such as the ones where our data come from –
without having to witness acts which run contrary to the customary rules that
govern behaviour in groups and societies (see, for example, Bicchieri 2006).
The intervener, however, legitimizes her or his action by invoking the mo-
rality principle (i.e., “moral oughts”) while the wrongdoer delegitimizes the
intervener’s action by invoking notions of politeness (i.e., “social oughts”).5
The articulation of these principles within the “ritual of outspokenness” (Kádár
2013; see Section 2) provides us with a lens from which to explore the intersec-
tionality between (im)politeness, morality and metapragmatics. The notion of
“(im)politeness” used in this article draws on Culpeper’s (2011) concept of
“moral oughts”, and the metapragmatic voicing of these oughts, in particular
the assumed right of being undisturbed in one’s private space. Following Kádár
and Haugh (2013), in those cases where, we contrast the (im)polite metaprag-
matic appeals of the wrongdoer and the (im)moral appeals of the intervening
bystander, we argue that politeness is not necessarily at play. This is because
these types of events would inherently disqualify its actors from their entitle-
ment to be treated politely. Such a view would reflect the understanding of
3 And possibly in private, too. This, however, is not demonstrable on the basis of our data.
4 For example, when a member of the public is engrossed in reading on a park bench and a
couple sits on the bench and starts arguing thus disturbing the reader’s personal space, result-
ing in her or him butting in.
5 We use “principle” in the non-Leechian (1983) sense. By principle we refer here to a mental
and emotional motivation that is primordial and offers both the wrongdoer and the intervener
a starting point to argue in favour or against each other’s behaviour.
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many bystanders (and possibly that of the analyst, too) but not that of the
wrongdoer, as illustrated by his or her metaappeals to politeness. Thus, in line
with Kádár and Haugh (2013), we contend that any framework of (im)politeness
should bring together various understandings of politeness, hence making it
unnecessary to solely look into the evaluations made by wrongdoers. As we
maintain in Section 6, this analytic perspective reveals an important aspect of
politeness norms, namely that references to (im)politeness can operate as an
interactional resource for a wrongdoer in certain interpersonal settings.
In sum, our study aims to contribute to current research on (im)politeness
by offering a yet unexplored dimension: that of the interface between meta-
pragmatics (Lucy 2004), (im)politeness and (im)morality in the interactional
arena of outspokenness (Kádár 2013).
2 Previous research on (im)politeness and
(im)morality
Since Eelen’s (2001) seminal study, research into (im)politeness has strived to
bring together different accounts on politeness – such culture-insider vs. cul-
ture-outsider and more general theoretical accounts – with various degrees of
success (see, for example, Mills 2003; Watts 2003; Linguistic Politeness Re-
search Group 2011). Indeed, the role of metapragmatics to help to disentangle
this distinction and provide the analyst with a potentially robust epistemologi-
cal account of (im)politeness has been voiced by Culpeper (2011) and, more
recently, by Kádár and Haugh (2013) and Haugh (2013), the latter with particu-
lar regard to the relationship between morality and (im)politeness, albeit with-
out foregrounding the role played by metapragmatics in this interrelationship,
something that we aim to do here.6
Our paper brings together a first and second order analysis by drawing on
theoretical conceptualizations of ritual, (im)politeness and (im)morality (see
also Kádár and Haugh 2013) and participants’ metacommunicative orientations
to (im)politeness and (im)morality. This is because the participants’ behaviour
and, in particular that of the main protagonists – the intervener and the alleged
6 See also Pizziconi’s (2012) as yet unpublished inquiry into the metapragmatics of morality
in Japanese.
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wrongdoer – constitute metapragmatic verbal behaviour7 as evidenced by the
action of intervening itself and the way in which it is articulated.
Our examination of the relationship between (im)politeness and (im)moral-
ity seeks to contribute to previous research in this area. Recent studies by Arun-
dale (2013) and Haugh (2013) have drawn attention to the importance of morali-
ty for research on (im)politeness. Although from slightly different theoretical
perspectives, the authors maintain that morality has been overlooked despite
the fact that (im)politeness is, after all, a matter of evaluation (Eelen 2001) and,
evaluations of (im)politeness often revolve around issues of morality. Haugh
(2013: 54) has recently argued that an evaluation of (im)politeness should be
seen not only as situated within social practices, but also “as a form of social
practice in and of itself”. Morality (and immorality) emerges through the partic-
ipants’ social practice-based expectations as to how interactions should unfold,
and it influences the evaluative practice without the participants necessarily
noticing it. Put simply, an improper flow of events may emerge as “immoral”
from a participant’s point of view, without the participant necessarily defining
the event as such. We agree with Haugh that evaluations of (im)politeness
come into existence through such situated expectations; however, we contend
that morality, in the interactional environment we examine here, intersects with
(im)politeness also in a different respect.8 That is, morality as we examine it
appears on the level of metapragmatics: this is because evaluations of (im)po-
liteness often involve a folk-theoretical/philosophical understanding of morali-
ty that is, in such evaluations morality itself is visibly voiced. Such moral evalu-
ations are recurrent and so they constitute a practice in the conversation
analytic sense. Our data show that outspokenness is triggered by what the
intervener – and possibly other bystanders, too – see as the impermissible
violation of the victim’s rights, and thus what is considered to be tolerable in
interpersonal relationships according to a given culture’s or group’s moral
norms. In sum, then, we aim to contribute to on-going research by emphasizing
the importance of studying moral principles as they are understood in a lay/
philosophical-second order sense, within the evaluative action.
7 Non-verbal metacommunicative behaviour is also observable in interactional gaps, silences
and other forms of dispreferred responses through which participants project their disalign-
ment with respect to a prior action. They thus indicate their interpretation of their interlocu-
tor’s agenda and their (own) positioning. Non-verbal communicative behaviour may also
entail a physical response without any verbal articulation (e.g., an intervener removing a
victim from a scene of injustice without any verbal voicing [Kádár and de la Cruz in press]).
8 Note that this argument is explored in detail using Chinese and Japanese data in the forth-
coming monograph of Haugh and Kádár (2016).
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In order to illustrate the type of (im)moral perceptions/evaluations exam-
ined in this paper, let us consider an interaction from our database:
(1) Dog left inside a hot car
A dog is left is in the back seat of car on a very hot day and barks loudly
as people pass by. It is illegal to leave a pet in a car in New Jersey.
1 Female: It’s just so hot in there. […] But, the police are coming right
now.
2 Dog owner: You called the cops? How is any of that your concern?
3 Female: The dog is in there panting and could die. That’s our concern.
Not you.
Our examples demonstrate that the intervener rests her or his case on moral
principles that are so basic they can be invoked without having to consider the
broader context i.e., the intervener, a bystander who becomes an interactional
side-participant, albeit unratified by the wrongdoer,9 is interfering in someone
else’s intimate relationship (e.g., the relationship of “ownership” in the case of
Example 1). The bystander intervention makes manifest the intervener’s reflexive
evaluation – and possibly that of other bystanders, too – of what is going on in
someone else’s private realm. Such metapragmatic assessment is primordially
moral in that it brings to the fore the inadmissibility of the observed behaviour
in as much as it violates basic personal rights (Jarvis Thomson 1990).10 The
notion of “basic personal rights” in our interpretation covers a cluster of moral
perception centered on the beliefs that human beings (and other livings crea-
tures such as the dog in Example 1) are entitled to not to be abused.
The intervener – as presumably many of the other bystanders who decide
not to intervene (Kent 2011) – tends to see the alleged violation as part of the
public’s business despite the fact that the behaviour that is being contested
may well form part of private life. In Example 1, a clear metacomment that
evidences this fact is the utterance “That’s our [i.e., the company of the inter-
vener (with whom she has probably been muttering about the wrongdoer’s
9 In a sense, it would be possible to argue that the dog owner ratifies the intervener’s partici-
pation by engaging in a conversation with her. However, the comment “[h]ow is any of that
your concern?” indicates that the owner’s view is that the intervener is acting beyond her
status as a passive bystander, i.e., her status is unratified from the wrongdoer’s point of view.
10 It is important to emphasize that our notion of morality is not contradictory with how
Haugh approaches this concept (2013). As Kádár and de la Cruz (in press) argue, actions that
are regarded as immoral can also upset interactional expectations, i.e., there is an important
interface between interactional and folk-theoretical/philosophical definitions of morality.
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behaviour), and, by extension, the public’s] concern.” (line 3).11 The wrongdo-
er’s action coupled with the victim’s reaction (or lack of) seem to the intervener
as encroaching on the “normative condition of what is permitted to be done to
persons, what persons are permitted to do, [and] what sorts of justifications are
required for preventing them from doing what they want” (Nagel 1995: 85). In
other words, the wrongdoer’s behaviour violates “the kind of place that should
be occupied by individuals in a moral system – how their lives, actions, and
interests should be recognized by the system of justification and authorization
that constitutes a morality” (Nagel 1995: 85).
It then follows, that morality – as we approach it in this paper at least, as
a folk-theoretical and philosophical rather than a practice-based interactional
notion – is not always contingent on social practice. It is for this very reason
that morality takes precedence over other considerations such as (im)politeness
or relatedness, as metacommunicatively voiced by the interveners in our exam-
ples. In this sense, the ritual of outspokenness provides us with a prime interac-
tional environment in which to examine the interrelationship between (im)po-
liteness, (im)morality and metapragmatics as foregrounded by the participants
themselves. With this in mind, our study brings metapragmatics into the fold
and addresses a current concern about the future development of (im)polite-
ness research.
When examining the wrongdoer’s behaviour (see Section 3), metalexical
elements such as “You’re being rude” are often absent.12 Instead, the wrongdo-
er refers to the impolite/inappropriate nature of bystander intervention through
metacommunicative comments related to non-debatable “personal rights” (e.g.,
“this is my girlfriend”, see Example 2). The intervener, on the other hand,
makes metacommunicative appeals to morality (e.g., “[i]t’s completely inappro-
priate,” see Example 3)13 (see also Section 5).
11 Note that “Not you” in this line can be interpreted two ways: as a put-down (you horrible
person, you, unlike the dog, are not worth being concerned about), and also as a reassurance
about the absence of hostile interpersonal intentions (the intention in calling the police is not
to get you into trouble but to save the dog). The prosody of the utterance seems to indicate
to us that the case is the former.
12 This is, however, not a “rule.” Note that in our data metalexemes seem to gain more
importance in the intervener’s rather than in the wrongdoer’s metapragmatic behaviour, for
example, when the intervener combines metacommunicative appeals to morality with claims
that the wrongdoer’s behaviour is also socially inappropriate; in such cases, metalexical
elements such as “You’re being rude” are relatively common (see, for example, Extract 3).
This difference between the metapragmatic behaviours of the wrongdoer and the intervener
presumably comes from their different roles (see more in Section 5).
13 In our data we also observed a few metacommunicative appeals that were metalexical by
nature, although such examples were rare. More specifically, Kádár and de la Cruz (in press)
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Our examples feature cases where the intervener legitimizes her or his in-
tervention by invoking the morality that ought to exist in displays of intimacy
in the public domain as observed in the way in which the intervention is formu-
lated. Specifically, the intervener mobilizes appeals to moral principles by di-
rectly addressing the wrongdoer and the victim while attempting to recruit
other bystanders (see Section 1). As argued elsewhere (Kádár 2013), in this
scene it is possible for bystanders to get involved and support the wrongdoer
rather than the intervener. In these cases an alternative morality principle is
interactionally observed, namely one that is aligned with that of the wrongdoer
rather than with the victim. Although this is possible given that personal rights,
at least in the US, are not self-evident (Jarvis Thomson 1990; Nagel 1995) in
that they are often subjected to challenges and (meta)debated; the examples
examined in this paper do not contain any instances of this.
In our data the alleged abuser reacts by invoking politeness (and impolite-
ness) grounds as he or she appeals to infringements of what Brown and Levin-
son (1987) would define as “negative face,” i.e., reference to the abuser’s right
to be left undisturbed in her or his private space.14 Theoretically speaking, the
moral grounds invoked by the intervener ought to be more prevalent than
grounds of politeness as evidenced by the fact that she or he intervened despite
the difficulty that entering into others’ personal spaces implies (see, for exam-
ple, Kent 2011). The seeming immorality of the abuser’s action is rooted in the
fact that the wrongdoer is intimately related to the victim so the abuser acts
contrary to normative behavioural expectations in public (also in the sense that
one is expected to be non-conflictive in such settings). Put differently, in the
public domain the morality principle is mobilized to do what one should not
possibly do otherwise (e.g., instructing an unknown dog owner about the
norms of pet keeping, as in Example 1). This is congruent with the ritual nature
of bystander intervention: as ritual anthropologists and psychologists argue
that in ritual actions the individual often challenges conventional behavioural
constraints.
discuss cases when interveners use citations of religious origin, such as “Don’t judge!” (after
the intervener explicitly advises the wrongdoer to read the Bible). Whilst such citations are
not metalexemes in a strict sense, they are on the border between metalexicon and metacom-
munication due to their formulaic nature.
14 We use the Brown and Levinsonian term here as a default one, simply because in our
American English data this notion seems applicable. However, it is important to emphasize
that the ritual of outspokenness exists in cultures, such as Chinese and Japanese, in which
the validity of the Brown and Levinsonian framework has received severe criticism (see, for
example, Ide [1989]; Kádár [forthcoming] on outspokenness in Sino-Japanese data.)
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As Koster (2003: 219) notes, ritual produces “a temporary destruction of
awareness of the wider meaningful relations of one’s individuality and the re-
duction of self to the immediate physical experience of the here and now.”
Relatedly, Kádár and de la Cruz (in press) note that the ritual of outspokenness
(re)enacts normative moral expectations, and so it reinforces the behavioural
norms “moral order” that ought to underlie human relations (Whutnow 1989).
Therefore, in this ritual action the intervener voices what he or she understands
as the public concern. Our examples show that the moral order should be ob-
served in public even when the relationship between the wrongdoer and the
victim is an intimate one. In these scenes, therefore, outspokenness is usually
interpreted (at least, by the intervener) as a justified form of intervention
(Drummond 1989), which is immoral on the surface due to its violative nature
but open to be reinterpreted as moral.
3 Data
The interactions we examine come from Primetime: What Would You Do?
(henceforth WWYD),15 a United States television programme dedicated to fea-
turing cases of outspokenness within bystander intervention (see Kádár and de
la Cruz in press for more information on the programme).16 WWYD is a docu-
drama or a fly on the wall documentary made with the help of secret cameras
(see, for example, Livingstone 1999).
WWYD, hosted by the reporter John Quiñones, premiered on ABC’s televi-
sion channel in the US in 2008. The theme behind the show is that actors act
out scenes in which some type of conflict or illegal activity occurs; there are
hidden cameras that record the event, and the focus is on whether bystanders
intervene as side-participants or not. Bystanders are unaware that they are be-
ing observed. This is important when considering that not performing rituals
of outspokenness often occasions shame (Darley and Latané 1968) and antici-
pation of an audience triggered by “double articulation” – that is, the aware-
ness that someone’s behaviour is being broadcast on the television (see, for
example, Livingstone 2007) – does not necessarily influence the behaviour of
15 See: <http://abc.go.com/shows/what-would-you-do>
16 It is pertinent to note that WWYD is not the first of such shows; in a sense it can be
regarded as an “inheritor” of the British series Candid Camera and its later versions in different
countries. However, a unique feature of WWYD, as far as we are aware, is that it focuses on
social problems and abuse in particular.
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the bystanders.17 The programme features follow up interviews where Quiñones
queries those who intervened and those who do not. This, in turn, offers the
analyst a window into the (non)interveners’ reflections on their own behav-
iours.
In this paper we analyze four interactions from a database of 117 video
recordings of 2–3 minutes in length. This database of 117 recording features
cases of an intervener interfering in someone else’s intimate relationship and
thus infringing on their private space (Brown and Levinson 1987) as conven-
tionally understood in US public settings (see, for example, Nelson 2002). The
particular examples examined have been selected due to the clarity of meta-
pragmatic voicing (i.e., the metapragmatic articulation of moral principles) that
can be observed in the interactions. Importantly, these examples offer us a
window into the intersection of (im)politeness and (im)morality via the partici-
pants’ metacommunicative privileging of one over the other. As such, metacom-
municative voicing is the interactional mechanism that enables us to shed light
on the dynamics of social versus moral oughts within intervention.
The analysis we present is discourse analytic in the broad sense. It draws
on notions from the field of (im)politeness research including Goffmanian con-
cepts such as “(dis)alignment,” “footing” and “face” and, integrates conceptu-
alizations of bystander intervention and morality from social psychology and
philosophy respectively.
4 Analysis
Example (2), below, illustrates the tension between moral and social oughts.
The intervener privileges the former while the abuser brings to the fore what
he considers to be the prevalence of the latter.
17 It is worth adding, however, that as these events occur in a public space bystanders are
potentially observable by other bystanders, and that once they intervene they may well
become the focus of these bystanders’ attention. So there is a sense of being (potentially)
observed in such interactions, but this is presumably different from the sense of being under
surveillance all the time, as in the case of double-articulated TV shows. Although the study
of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is possible that the prospect of being observed
by other bystanders is, for some people, a deterrent to intervening when otherwise they would
have done so.
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(2) Abusive boyfriend
A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem
conflicted over intervention. An elderly female bystander decides to inter-
vene.
1 Boyfriend: Stop crying. Shut up!
2 Elderly female: Hey buddy! Cool it!
3 Boyfriend: Ma’am, can you just let us do our own thing? It’s my girl-
friend. Can you just leave us alone?
4 Elderly female: No. That’s not how you treat someone. How about I call
the cops?
Here the intervener, an elderly woman, draws the attention of the wrongdoer
with “Hey buddy! Cool it!” The inclusion of “buddy” with an accentuated and
ironic prosody is clearly conflictive in that it conveys the opposite of its literal
meaning: the person addressed is not a friend of the intervener. Whilst “buddy”
is not necessarily used to belittle, it is pragmatically appropriate to signal disa-
greement or opposition, and this meaning is even stronger in this interaction
due to the emotive context and also to the age gap between the wrongdoer
and the intervening person. Thus, the presence of “buddy” indicates a lack of
alignment with the activity of the wrongdoer and paves the way for the alterna-
tive behaviour suggested by the intervener. Importantly, the alleged wrongdoer
challenges the intervention by appealing to rights to privacy. He does this by
adopting a routine footing (Zimmerman 1998) typically used when addressing
elderly strangers in the U.S. (i.e., Ma’am). In so doing, he signals the respect
and/or distance (Márquez Reiter and Placencia 2004) that ought to exist be-
tween complete strangers followed by a conventionally indirect request in
which he constructs the intervener as an outsider. The wrongdoer does this by
addressing the intervener as an interferer in as much as he treats her as an
unratified participant in the argument. This is illustrated by the possessive sec-
ond person plural (i.e., “our”), which emphasizes the illegitimacy of the inter-
vener’s action. Further support for his appeal to privacy is offered by his subse-
quent justification (“It’s my girlfriend”) followed by an appeal to the intervener
to stop interfering the in-group conversation. The intervener, however, rejects
being constructed as an interferer by invoking morality grounds and threaten-
ing to call the relevant authority unless the wrongdoer stops. Specifically, the
intervener brings to the fore the morality that should permeate human relation-
ships; the notion of the proper treatment of others, which has been a key com-
munal concept in philosophy and religion since antiquity (Graham and Haidt
2010). In so doing, the intervener makes evident a case where morality princi-
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ples take precedence over politeness ones, if we accept that respecting others’
personal spaces is polite.
Example (3), below, represents another case of a bystander intervening in
someone else’s personal relationship. In this example, the intervener directly
addresses both the abuser and then the victim as a result of the abuser’s initial
dismissal of the bystander’s intervention.
(3) Abusive boyfriend
A couple is arguing in the park. Bystanders overhear the argument but seem
conflicted over intervention. A young female., who is with a couple of friends,
decides to intervene.
1 Boyfriend: Natalie sit down and listen to me. [pushes Natalie]
2 Young female: I could see you from up there. You do not push a woman
out in public. That is complete bullshit.
3 Young female: [turning to Natalie] Seriously, do you need a ride home?
4 Boyfriend: Natalie, sit down. This is my girlfriend.
5 Young female: Wait. Who are you talking to? She is not a dog. You are
just a little punk-ass kid and getting on my last nerve.
Unlike (2), in this example, the intervener turns to the victim to offer her a
lift home. This alignment attempt seems to boost the disalignment from the
wrongdoer, which takes place in the form of the negatively-loaded taboo items
“bullshit” (to refer to the situation) and “little punk-ass kid” (a person reference
term) to characterize the abuser. As discussed elsewhere (Kádár and de la Cruz
in press), this example demonstrates how alignment situated in intervention
has a clear disaligning metamessage (Jaworski 1993). In this case, the interven-
er seems to justify her action by invoking normative behavioural expectations
in public spaces rather than articulating the weightiness of the morality princi-
ple over the politeness one.
Yet, whilst the claim that “You do not push a woman out in public” not
only indexes the wrongdoer’s infringement of the intervener’s right not to be
exposed to such a disturbing scene in public,18 more importantly, it is a moral
appeal. That is, “being gentle with women” is a chivalrous Judeo-Christian
moral heritage, which is deeply rooted in Western societies (often despite many
18 It is pertinent to note that while it is equally intolerable to push a woman in private, in
our data we often encounter appeals to the public nature of an abuse, as in the case of
Example (3). This is because, as we argued earlier, engaging in an illegal-disturbing action in
public is, in a sense, an intrusion into the private spaces of the bystanders who are forced to
watch the scene.
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of these societies defining themselves as secular), and which has been inte-
grated into (and reinterpreted within) the modern moral concept of gender
equality (Visher 1983). Moreover, there might be an additional moral element
in this utterance to justify the intervention; if her boyfriend can treat her so
badly in public, there is a suspicion that he treats her even worse in private.
Example 4, below, illustrates yet another instance of immorality versus po-
liteness in action:
(4) Lesbian parents verbally abused
Lesbian couple eating breakfast with their two kids at a restaurant in Texas.
The server berates and humiliates the lesbian couple. Several customers
overhear the server.
1 Server: You’re gay and you have kids? It’s bad enough that you are
lesbians but that they don’t have a father. …… I think that is
kind of bad. You don’t feel uncomfortable – people watching
you? Isn’t it bad for the kids? I think it’s terrible!
2 [Lesbian couple does not answer and looks very embar-
rassed.]
3 Young male: Sorry, but you are just being rude. It’s completely inappropri-
ate when someone comes into a restaurant to have a break-
fast with their family that you question their life choices.
4 Server: I just think I am entitled to my own opinion.
5 Young male: You are entitled to your opinion but this is not the place to
voice your opinion.
6 Server: Is it just me that’s upset? [looks to different directions in the
restaurant]
In (4), a waitress steps out of her institutional role. She adopts a non-instru-
mental footing (Goffman 1979) and verbally attacks some customers (i.e., a
lesbian couple with children). While the victims react by remaining silent, thus
apparently dismissing the waitress’s action, a bystander (i.e., another custom-
er) intervenes. He challenges the waitress by explicitly accusing her of being
impolite.19 He does this by bringing to the fore the responsibilities that an
incumbent of the waiter/ess category should abide by (cf. Pomerantz and Man-
delbaum 2005) in the workplace, by indirectly drawing attention to the server’s
role (“when someone comes into a restaurant to have a breakfast”). The wait-
ress reacts by making a (counter-) appeal to the bystanders’ morality to validate
19 Here we follow Culpeper’s (2011) suggestion to categorize metalexemes such as “rude”
under the technical notion of impoliteness.
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her action and repair damage to face. In return, the intervener responds by
foregrounding the normative behaviour that she is expected to observe in a
public space, perhaps particularly as an incumbent of the service provider cat-
egory. This example shows the general perceived moral importance of fulfilling
the responsibilities associated with given institutional roles in their respective
institutional settings and the extent to which any violations of the normative
behaviour regarding role responsibilities, particularly when these are seen to
infringe on the rights of others (i.e., customers), are deemed impugnable.20
Our final Example, 5 below, shows the intervener’s appeal to morality
based on the non-self-evidence of personal rights (Jarvis Thomson 1990; Nagel
1995, see Section 1) rather than on the tension that in the previous examples
was shown between (im)politeness and (im)morality.
(5) Gay athlete comes out to his friends
A group of male friends are at a busy shopping centre. One of the group has
started to intimate to the others that he is gay. His friends start to tease him
and utter homophobic slurs. A female overhears the teasing and steps in
immediately and says the friends should not tease the gay person and they
should not be so hard on him. Line 1 below takes place after the “friends”
of the gay athlete have already started to comprehend the situation, and the
athlete makes the actual coming out.
1 Gay person: I have something to tell you guys.
2 Friend: Stop playing bro! You are gay? G-A-Y? [starts laughing and
backs away from gay athlete]
3 Gay person: Yes.
4 Friend: You really don’t like females? You don’t like girls? You
know what we call males that like men?
5 Young female: Ya’ll wrong. I heard the conversation. Ya’ll ain’t right.
That’s your friend?
6 Friend: That was my friend.
7 Young female: What do you mean was? That shouldn’t stop you guys from
being friends.
[…]
20 Note that the importance of institutional role in this case reflects only our reading of the
interaction. Yet, there are certain evidences within the interaction that point to the fact that
from the intervening person’s perspective the server’s institutional role is important: he uses
both the verb “comes into” (as opposed to ‘is’) and the indefinite article before ‘breakfast’ as
indexing the position of the server (the latter because only service providers deal with counta-
ble breakfasts; ordinary people just have non-countable breakfast).
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In this example, the young female who intervenes does so by initially appealing
to morality through increased negative assessments (“Ya’ll wrong,” “Ya’ll ain’t
right”). Specifically, she defends the right of the victim to have his personal
choices respected, especially among friends, by questioning the abuser’s be-
haviour (“That’s your friend?”) and offering a reflective evaluation of the moral-
ity that should permeate this form of relatedness (“That shouldn’t stop you
guys from being friends”). In other words, she proffers her understanding of
the way in which friends should behave towards one another (i.e., social
oughts). Unlike our previous examples, (5) illustrates that in certain situations
social and moral oughts do not necessarily clash with each other but are de-
pendent on each other (cf. Haugh 2013). That is, the young female approaches
the group of friends in a friendly way, rather than intervening aggressively, but
still manages to reinstate what the public regards as morally right. As Kádár
and de la Cruz (forthcoming) argue, such a joint operation of politeness and
morality is largely subject to contextual factors, such as the ongoing power
dynamics, the age and gender of the intervener, and so on.
5 Discussion
The data studied indicates that a juxtaposition can take place between polite-
ness – in our case, the right of in-group interactants to be undisturbed – and
morality when an act of injustice triggers intervention and, that in other situa-
tions such as the one depicted in Example (5) (im)politeness and (im)morality
interact with each other in mutually beneficial ways. The conventional norm
of avoiding conflict and not entering into others’ private spaces is overwritten
by the moral need for intervention. Bystander intervention is expected by other
bystanders, and as such it is a performance that fulfils moral needs (see Section 1).
It is interesting to observe the metapragmatics of bystander intervention
from both the intervener’s and the wrongdoer’s perspectives. In the intervener’s
case, not surprisingly, moral issues are at the centre of the metacommunicative
articulation observed. Utterances such as “That’s not how your treat someone”
(Example 2) and “Who are you talking to? She is not a dog!” (Example 3) repre-
sent appeals to expected moral behaviour in that such behaviour contravenes
personal rights, and the moral principles that these rights entail. These appeals
are metacommunicative. They describe the moral norms behind the intervener’s
action, rather than making use of an explicit moral lexicon (“immoral,” “evil,”
etc.).
The situation seems to be different in the case of the wrongdoer who usual-
ly makes an appeal to the impolite nature of the intervention via metacommuni-
Brought to you by | University of Surrey George Edwards Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/19/15 11:42 AM
DE GRUYTER MOUTON (Im)politeness and (im)morality 255
cative references to her or his rights (e.g., “Ma’am, can you just let us do our
own thing? It’s my girlfriend. Can you just leave us alone?” in Example 2). This
is self-evident, considering that bystander intervention takes place in a scene
of aggression, and the aggressor (the wrongdoer) cannot really make direct
appeals to broader normative behaviour, but rather he or she has to refer to
personal rights which presuppose that the act of bystander intervention contra-
vene/are at odds with these broader norms.
It is important again to emphasize that we do not intend to claim that the
metacommunicative comments from the intervener and wrongdoer always fol-
low an immorality versus impoliteness schema. Here we should refer to the fact
that bystander intervention is a ritual, and as such it is a performance. Exactly
because of this, the raison d’être of its operation is that the intervener – and
potentially the wrongdoer – attempts to align with other bystanders. That is, if
the wrongdoer takes up a counter-offensive position, she or he may refer to
moral norms as a counter-appeal; we could observe this in Example 4, in which
the wrongdoer makes such an appeal to her moral “obligation” to denounce
the lesbian couple (“Is it just me that’s upset?”). We should note, however, that
in our dataset of 117 video recordings there are only 5 of such cases which
illustrate that the debate between the intervener and the wrongdoer revolve
around moral obligations and conventional rights.
The metacommunicative analysis of such clashes and symbiotic depend-
ence (i.e., Example 4) is not only useful because it shows the importance of
morality, but also because it reveals a potential characteristic of (im)politeness,
which is rarely discussed in the field, namely that appeals to appropriate be-
haviour and references to the other’s impoliteness can actually become discur-
sive resources utilized by wrongdoers to legitimize their actions and challenge
those of others.
The following figure illustrates the operation of metacommunicative juxta-
positions in scenes of interruption.
Figure 1: The Metacommunicative Operationalization of (Im)Morality and (Im)Politeness.
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The circle around the wrongdoer and the victim represents the intimacy of
their relationship, which is threatened by the act of bystander intervention; the
victim is denoted in brackets, since she or he tends to be a passive participant
of the event.21 The arrows represent the appeals made by the intervener and the
wrongdoer; the arrow of the wrongdoer’s morality appeal and the intervener’s
politeness is dashed, in order to denote that 1. these types of conversational
patterns are less typical, and 2. that they can jointly operate with the default
appeal and counter-appeal of the intervener and the wrongdoer. The dotted
line above bystanders indicates that bystanders can take sides and join the
flow of events as supporters (see Kádár and de la Cruz in press), and that the
ritual of outspokenness, and the wrongdoer’s counter-action, represent a strug-
gle to align with bystanders.
6 Conclusion
In the present paper we have inquired into a neglected aspect of the relation-
ship between (im)politeness and (im)morality, by looking into participants’ un-
derstandings and perceptions of moral and/or polite values as evidenced by
their metacommunicative voicing. We have argued that morality is not always
contingent on social practice as a phenomenon “unseen” for the participants,
and not necessarily a social practice in and of itself, but rather a phenomenon
that people perceive and define. This is because first order interactant percep-
tions of morality include personal rights (see the discussion in Section 1 on
Nagel 1995; Jarvis Thomson 1990; and Bicchieri 2006), and second order folk-
theoretical/philosophical meta-accounts of morality include definitions of these
rights. By examining this topic, we have relied on conceptualizations drawn
from social psychology and philosophy, and we integrated these conceptualiza-
tions into politeness research. By doing so, we have continued the work of
scholars such as Holtgraves (2005) and Spencer-Oatey (2007) who laid down
the foundations of social psychological inquiries into (im)politeness phenome-
na; considering that this article is written for the anniversary issue of the Jour-
nal of Politeness Research, we feel that it is important for us to draw attention
to the importance of investing energy into this research area.
Due to its limited scope, this study has only made some initial inquiry into
the intersection of (im)morality and (im)politeness. The phenomenon of morali-
21 As Kádár and de la Cruz (in press) note, the passivity of the victim is a key factor for
intervention to operate.
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ty needs to be further studied both within and outside of the bystander inter-
vention arena. For example, a key phenomenon to address is the cross-cultural
aspect of moral judgements. As the preliminary results of an on-going research
(see Kádár forthcoming) seem to indicate, there are noteworthy cross-cultural
differences in the ways in which the act of help is moralized across cultures;
also there are cultural differences between the normative cultural perceptions
of the appropriateness of certain types of bystander intervention. It would also
be useful for future studies to explore the extent to which metacommunication
is operationalized differently across cultures, based on different understand-
ings of personal rights and what is deemed socially acceptable behaviour. For
example, personal rights are not self-evident in the normative US cultural con-
text but, as Ting-Toomey’s (2012: 112–116) study convincingly pointed out, this
situation might be different in other cultures. Such differences are likely to
manifest themselves in differences between the ways in which metacommuni-
cation is operationalized when it comes to violations of rights. Finally, by exam-
ining an array of interactional contexts, including everyday, institutional and
ritual interaction across cultures, we could further unravel the demonstrated
intersectionality between (im)politeness, (im)morality and metapragmatics with
a view to strengthening the methodological apparatus with which we work.
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